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Nuclear deterrence is back. Of course, it had never disappeared, but 
retreated into the background as a hedge against future uncertainties. 
Hopes of overcoming the deterrence system through nuclear disarmament 
have been dashed. Nuclear deterrence gains new importance in the era 
of great power competitions. Arms control is stagnating, even eroding, and 
the modernisation of nuclear arsenals is progressing. 
Through nuclear sharing arrangements within the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), Germany is involved in nuclear deterrence. This 
includes the ability to deliver American nuclear bombs stored in Germany. 
So far, this has been ensured by nuclear-capable Tornado fighter bombers, 
due to be replaced in the foreseeable future. 
Against this background, nuclear deterrence and its strategic, legal, 
ethical, and political problems and dilemmas are assessed in this research 
paper. The focus is on US deterrence policy and its role in the Western 
alliance. This analysis of nuclear deterrence and its problems and dilemmas 




SWP Research Paper 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 
German Institute for 




US Nuclear Deterrence Policy 
and Its Problems 
 
 





All rights reserved. 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, 2018 
SWP Research Papers are 
peer reviewed by senior 
researchers and the execu-
tive board of the Institute. 
They are also subject to fact-
checking and copy-editing. 
For further information 
on our quality control pro-
cedures, please visit the 





SWP Research Papers reflect 
the views of the author(s). 
SWP 








Phone +49 30 880 07-0 




Translation by the author 




Table of Contents 
 5 Issues and Conclusions 
 7 Extended Deterrence and US Nuclear Doctrine 
 11 The Strategic Dimension: Logic and Illogic of 
Counterforce Deterrence 
 16 The Legal Dimension: Approaches to Legitimising 
Nuclear Deterrence and Their Problems 
 20 The Ethical Dimension: Approaches to Justifying 
Nuclear Deterrence and Their Contradictions 
 23 The Political Dimension: Risks and Costs of the 
Deterrence System 
 27 Conclusions 




Dr. Peter Rudolf is a Senior Fellow in SWP’s 
The Americas Division. 
 
  SWP Berlin 
 US Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Its Problems 
 November 2018 
 5 
 
Issues and Conclusions 
US Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Its 
Problems 
Nuclear deterrence is back. Of course, it had never 
disappeared, but retreated into the background as 
a hedge against future uncertainties. Hopes of over-
coming the deterrence system through nuclear dis-
armament have been dashed. Nuclear deterrence 
gains new importance in the era of great power com-
petitions. Arms control is stagnating, even eroding. 
The coalition agreement of 2018 states: “As long as 
nuclear weapons play a role as an instrument of 
deterrence in NATO’s strategic concept, Germany has 
an interest in participating in the strategic discussions 
and planning processes.” To date, nuclear sharing 
has included the ability to deliver American nuclear 
bombs stored in Germany. So far, this has been 
ensured by nuclear-capable Tornado fighter bombers, 
due to be replaced in the foreseeable future. 
Against this background, nuclear deterrence and 
its strategic, legal, ethical, and political problems 
and dilemmas are assessed in this research paper. The 
focus is on US deterrence policy and its role in the 
Western alliance. This analysis of nuclear deterrence 
and its aporias is intended to provide a basic orien-
tation for the new nuclear debate that is emerging. 
In the context of “extended deterrence”, US nuclear 
weapons have the function of deterring attacks against 
allied states. The problem of credibly deterring pos-
sible aggression against allies under conditions of 
mutual nuclear vulnerability has had a major impact 
on US nuclear doctrine, at both the declaratory and 
operational levels. Deterrence in the American under-
standing is based on the ability to have multiple, 
graduated nuclear options that are primarily directed 
against the military capabilities of a potential enemy, 
including missile silos, airports, strategic submarine 
bases, and control and communication facilities. 
With this so-called counterforce orientation, the cred-
ibility of the deterrent threat is to be increased and, 
in the event of war, the damage (for one’s own side) 
is to be limited as far as possible. 
Following the strategic logic of such a “conventio-
nalisation” of nuclear deterrence, it is deemed neces-
sary to prepare for a wide a range of scenarios and to 
have options at hand that correspond to those of the 
adversary. In a military conflict, one’s own scope of 
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action is to be expanded and the burden of further 
escalation imposed on the other side. According to 
this logic, which is also reflected in the 2018 Nuclear 
Posture Review (NPR), the United States needs a range 
of nuclear options that can be used in a controlled 
manner, including low-yield nuclear weapons in par-
ticular. The hope is that, once war has broken out, 
nuclear escalation can remain controlled. But, as 
during the East-West conflict, US war planners can 
come up with only one answer to the problem of how 
to limit and end a nuclear war: namely by having as 
many flexible options as possible, including the rarely 
mentioned capacity for pre-emptive options against 
enemy nuclear weapons. The combination of targeted 
nuclear and conventional weapons as well as ad-
vances in strategic anti-submarine warfare and cyber-
warfare have expanded the possibilities for neutralis-
ing enemy nuclear weapons to such an extent that, 
in the US debate, there is talk about a “counterforce 
revolution”. 
According to thinking in the United States, coun-
terforce targeting allows for using nuclear weapons 
in a way that does not contradict the fundamental 
norms of international humanitarian law, which are 
the principles of distinction and proportionality. 
From this point of view, the legality of nuclear deter-
rence presupposes the possibility for the lawful use 
of nuclear weapons. This approach of legitimising 
the use of nuclear weapons focusses on targeted 
strikes of low-yield nuclear weapons against military 
objects. However, these objects are understood in 
a very broad sense that is considered controversial 
under international law. The uncontrollable con-
sequences from the use of nuclear weapons, that is, 
radioactive fallout and radiation, are ignored just as 
much as the cumulative effects from a series of low-
yield weapons bursts. 
Counterforce strategies are, as their proponents 
argue, a way out of the fundamental moral dilemma 
posed by nuclear deterrence. The basic objection, it is 
claimed, loses its validity if nuclear weapons can be 
used in such a way that civilians are not attacked 
intentionally and deterrence does not take the enemy 
population hostage. But the arguments put forward 
by proponents of such a deterrence policy are contra-
dictory: On the one hand, the unique nature of nu-
clear weapons is denied by claiming the possibility of 
their morally tolerable use; on the other hand, it is 
argued that nuclear deterrence “works” because it is 
based on the risk of uncontrollable escalation and 
incalculable costs. 
Under the conditions of the East-West confronta-
tion, there was the widespread expectation that 
nuclear deterrence based on the capacity of mutual 
destruction could permanently prevent war and 
secure “nuclear peace”. Undoubtedly, mutually 
assured destruction (called MAD) had a moderating 
effect on US and Soviet leaders during crises. How-
ever, the deterrent relationship between the United 
States and the Soviet Union remained strained by 
risks of instability. Both sides feared that the other 
could consider a pre-emptive strike during a serious 
international crisis. In the future, strategic stability 
could become even more fragile due to technological 
advances. A further development known from the 
time of East-West antagonism is also to be expected: 
the intensification of the security dilemma and, as a 
result, an ongoing arms race. Deterrence presupposes 
the aggressiveness of the state that is to be deterred. 
As long as this state has military capabilities that 
appear threatening in a worst-case scenario, it remains 
the potential enemy that only deterrence can keep in 
check. 
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NATO continues to regard itself as a “nuclear alliance”. 
In the event of a threat to a member state’s funda-
mental security, it has “the capabilities and resolve to 
impose costs on an adversary that would be unaccep-
table and far outweigh the benefits that any adversary 
could hope to achieve”, as most recently re-stated in 
the Brussels Summit Declaration of July 2018.1 The 
core of nuclear deterrence can hardly be summed 
up better than in this formulation. Deterrence aims 
to influence the intentions of potential opponents, 
namely their cost-benefit calculation; defence aims 
to limit one’s own costs and risks in case deterrence 
fails. With the development of nuclear weapons and 
long-range missiles and bombers, the functions of 
deterrence (in peace) and defence (in war), which 
were previously concentrated in the same weapons, 
were partly separated from one another. Within the 
framework of nuclear deterrence, nuclear weapons 
serve to deprive the opponent of the possibility of 
making a relatively straightforward cost-benefit cal-
culation and to increase the amount of uncertainty 
about the overall costs of aggression.2 
With respect to “extended deterrence”, this func-
tion – namely to make the consequences from ag-
gression incalculable and unacceptable – is desig-
nated above all to US nuclear weapons. Their task is 
therefore not limited to deterring an attack against 
the United States. They also serve to deter attacks 
against allied states, not only in Europe but also in 
Asia. The deterrent threat is ultimately based on US 
“strategic” nuclear weapons. There is no clear dis-
tinction between strategic and non-strategic (tactical) 
nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons have 
 
1 Brussels Summit Declaration. Issued by the heads of state 
and government participating in the meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council in Brussels, 11–12 July 2018, Number 36. 
2 See Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a 
Theory of National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1961), 3–5. 
traditionally been understood to mean short-range 
battlefield weapons. To use a simple pragmatic 
criterion, tactical or non-strategic weapons are those 
that are not covered by the relevant US-Soviet/Russian 
treaties limiting strategic nuclear weapons (SALT 
treaties, START treaties).3 
Three reasons are usually cited when it comes to 
the deterrent role of tactical nuclear weapons de-
ployed on the territory of allied states.4 Firstly, they 
may have direct military functions, in the sense of 
“deterrence by denial”.5 Secondly, they increase the 
risk of uncontrollable escalation. This corresponds 
to the logic of deterrence as a “competition in risk-
taking”. In this view, nuclear deterrence is not so 
much about military success on the battlefield, but 
about the resolve to take risks and embark on a 
process that is uncontrollable and could ultimately 
lead to high costs that neither side wants – and 
thus manipulate the common interest in avoiding 
nuclear war for one’s own benefit.6 Thirdly, the 
 
3 SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks); START (Strategic 
Arms Reduction Talks). See Amy F. Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear 
Weapons, CRS Report (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service [CRS], 21 February 2017), 6–8. 
4 For the following, see Todd S. Sechser, “Sharing the 
Bomb: How Foreign Nuclear Deployments Shape Nonprolif-
eration and Deterrence’’, The Nonproliferation Review 23, no. 
3–4 (2016): 443–58. 
5 On the distinction between “deterrence by denial” and 
“deterrence by punishment”, see Glenn H. Snyder, “Deter-
rence and Power”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 4, no. 2 (1960): 
163–78: “In military affairs deterrence by denial is accom-
plished by having military forces which can block the 
enemy’s military forces from making territorial gains. Deter-
rence by punishment grants him the gain but deters by 
posing the prospect of war costs greater than the values of 
the gain” (p. 163). 
6 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT, 
and London: Yale University Press, 1966), esp. ch. 3; see 
further Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy 
Extended Deterrence and 
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forward-deployment of tactical nuclear weapons has 
a signalling function. In terms of alliance policy, they 
serve to reassure allies. Even if militarily their deter-
rent roles might be obsolete, a change in the status 
quo could be interpreted as a politically questionable 
message. 
In the 1950s, the United States deployed tactical 
nuclear weapons in Western Europe as a counter-
weight to the conventional superiority of the Warsaw 
Pact. Nuclear deterrence gained great political and 
symbolic importance for NATO. This did not change 
when, in the early 1990s, the George H. W. Bush 
administration withdrew tactical nuclear weapons 
from Europe – with the exception of those 160 to 
200 American B61 nuclear bombs stationed at bases 
in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Turkey.7 They no longer had a real military function,8 
but they remained the embodiment of the American 
nuclear guarantee, even at a time when the former 
threat had long disappeared and a resurgent Russia 
was only a distant possibility. Although over the 
decades following the end of the East-West confron-
tation the deterrent rationale for the continued 
presence of tactical nuclear weapons was thin, their 
symbolic significance and NATO’s consensus-based 
decision-making procedures ensured that the status 
quo established in the early 1990s remained in place. 
There was no noteworthy political pressure to change 
this – apart from the bogged down German initiative 
in 2009/10 calling for the removal of American nu-
clear weapons from its territory. In NATO, nuclear 
issues have been handled so as to draw as little public 
attention as possible; in the societies of the member 
states, nuclear deterrence ceased to be a salient politi-
cal issue after the East-West confrontation had ended.9 
 
(Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1984), 
126–46. 
7 See Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons (see note 3), 13–
15. 
8 “Given the above-mentioned insight that nuclear weap-
ons have to be militarily usable (in a plausible manner) in 
order to have a political deterrence effect, the conceptual 
plausibility of NATO’s nuclear bombs on European soil in 
today’s security environment is close to nil.” Karl-Heinz 
Kamp and Robertus C. N. Remkes, “Options for NATO 
Nuclear Sharing Arrangements”, in Reducing Nuclear Risks in 
Europe: A Framework for Action, ed. Steve Andreasen and 
Isabelle Williams (Washington, DC, 2011), Nuclear Threat 
Initiative, 76–95 (83). 
9 See Trine Flockhart, “NATO’s Nuclear Addiction – 
12 Steps to ‘Kick the Habit’”, European Security 22, no. 3 
The role of extended deterrence has 
shaped American nuclear doctrine to 
a considerable extent. 
The role of extended deterrence has shaped Ameri-
can nuclear doctrine to a considerable extent. US 
nuclear weapons policy has been characterised by 
substantial continuity for more than four decades. 
This applies to both declaratory and operational 
nuclear policy. Declaratory policy has the function 
of communicating one’s own capabilities and inten-
tions, not only to potential opponents, but also to 
allied states. It aims at political and perceptual effects 
and contains a certain degree of ambiguity in order 
to maintain flexibility in a crisis situation. However, 
declaratory policy should not deviate too much from 
what is actually planned operationally.10 
Even Barack Obama’s administration did not break 
with the substantial continuity of declaratory policy 
following the end of the East-West confrontation. 
Although Obama adopted the vision of a nuclear 
weapons-free world and wanted to push ahead with 
negotiated disarmament, he did not shake the pillars 
of nuclear deterrence.11 Thus, contrary to some ex-
pectations, even under President Barack Obama there 
was no renunciation of the policy of first use of nu-
clear weapons. A proposal to this effect was consid-
 
(2013): 271–87. See also Martin A. Smith, “To Neither Use 
Them Nor Lose Them: NATO and Nuclear Weapons since the 
Cold War”, Contemporary Security Policy 25, no. 3 (December 
2004): 524–44; Michael Paul, Atomare Abrüstung. Probleme, 
Prozesse, Perspektiven, Schriftenreihe vol. 1248 (Bonn: Bundes-
zentrale für politische Bildung, 2011), 39–45. 
10 So Paul H. Nitze, “Atoms, Strategy and Policy”, Foreign 
Affairs 34, no. 2 (January 1956): 187–98, who distinguishes 
between “declaratory policy” and “action policy”, which in 
today’s parlance is called “employment policy” or “opera-
tional policy”. On the functions of “declaratory policy”, see 
Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (see note 2), 240–41, 246. 
11 See Harald Müller and Annette Schaper, US-Nuklearpolitik 
nach dem Kalten Krieg, HSFK-Report no. 3/2003 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung 
[HSFK], 2003); Amy F. Woolf, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes 
in Policy and Force Structure (Washington, DC: CRS, 23 January 
2008); Charles J. Moxley, Jr., “Obama’s Nuclear Posture 
Review: An Ambitious Program for Nuclear Arms Control 
But a Retreat from the Objective of Nuclear Disarmament”, 
Fordham International Law Journal 34 (2011): 734–75; Marco 
Fey, Giorgio Franceschini, Harald Müller and Hans-Joachim 
Schmidt, Auf dem Weg zu Global Zero? Die neue amerikanische 
Nuklearpolitik zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, HSFK-Report 
no. 4/2010 (Frankfurt am Main: HSFK, 2010). 
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ered towards the end of Obama’s second term, but it 
was met with rejection by the Secretaries of State, 
Defense, and Energy as well as allies in Europe and 
Asia. The Obama administration maintained the 
traditional policy of “calculated ambiguity”, accord-
ing to which the first use of nuclear weapons is not 
categorically excluded, but the conditions under 
which it could occur are not specified. The Nuclear 
Posture Review Report of 2010 and the Nuclear 
Employment Strategy of 2013 state that the use of 
nuclear weapons will only take place “in extreme 
circumstances” in order to defend the vital interests 
of the United States, its allies, and its partners. The 
threat and use of nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear weapon states that are members of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and comply with their treaty 
obligations are ruled out.12 In the 2018 Nuclear Pos-
ture Review, there is an addition to the “extreme 
circumstances” under which the use of nuclear 
weapons might be considered, namely in case of 
“significant non-nuclear strategic attacks”,13 which 
are probably to be understood as cyberattacks against 
the civilian population, infrastructure, as well as 
nuclear weapons and, in particular, their command-
and-control facilities. 
 
12 See Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report 
(Washington, DC, April 2010), IX, https://www.defense.gov/ 
Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture 
_Review_Report.pdf (accessed 2 May 2018); Department of 
Defense, Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United 
States Specified in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C. (June 2013), 4, https:// 
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/us-nuclear-
employment-strategy.pdf (accessed 2 May 2018). In addition, 
see Amy Woolf, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Considering “No 
First Use”, CRS Insight (Washington, DC: CRS, 16 August 
2016). 
13 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (February 
2018), 21, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/ 
-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF 
(accessed 2 May 2018). On the Nuclear Posture Review, see 
Oliver Meier, “The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and the 
Future of Nuclear Order”, Commentary, European Leadership 
Network, 2 March 2018; Wolfgang Richter, Erneuerung der 
nuklearen Abschreckung, SWP-Aktuell 15/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2018); Oliver Thränert, 
Präsident Trumps Kernwaffendoktrin, CSS Analysen zur Sicher-
heitspolitik no. 223 (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 
March 2018). 
US nuclear doctrine is characterised 
by considerable continuity. 
Although the United States has considerably 
reduced the number of its nuclear weapons compared 
to the East-West confrontation period, it has not 
broken with traditional nuclear doctrine at the level 
of operational strategy. On the one hand, this applies 
to the structure of the nuclear posture; nothing has 
changed in the triad of land-based intercontinental 
missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers. This also 
applies to the option of being able to make the 
decision to use nuclear weapons under extreme time 
pressure if the early warning systems report the 
launch of enemy missiles (“prompt launch”). This 
serves to prevent the worst-case scenario that US 
nuclear weapons are taken out by a first strike. 
Continuity also extends to target planning, which is 
guided by a counterforce approach. This involves 
the elimination of enemy military capabilities, in 
particular nuclear capabilities; that is, the targets 
include enemy missile silos, airports, strategic sub-
marine bases, and control and communication 
facilities.14 US nuclear deterrence policy does not 
“rely” on a so-called countervalue strategy.15 Counter-
value targets are “softer” targets. In today’s under-
standing, this does not mean cities, but, for example, 
industrial facilities that contribute to the ability to 
wage war.16 But even such targets can be covered 
 
14 “Counterforce Targeting. Counterforce targeting is a 
strategy to employ forces to destroy, or render impotent, 
military capabilities of an enemy force. Typical counterforce 
targets include bomber bases, ballistic missile submarine 
bases, ICBM silos, antiballistic and air defense installations, 
C2 centers, and WMD storage facilities. Generally, the nu-
clear forces required to implement a counterforce targeting 
strategy are larger and weapon systems more accurate than 
the forces and weapons required to implement a counter-
value strategy, because counterforce targets generally tend to 
be harder, more protected, difficult to find, and more mobile 
than countervalue targets.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for 
Joint Nuclear Operations, Joint Publication 3–12 (15 December 
1995), II–5, http://www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/JCS_JP3-
12_95.pdf (accessed 2 May 2018). (The original contains parts 
of the text in bold font.) 
15 “The new guidance requires the United States to main-
tain significant counterforce capabilities against potential 
adversaries. The new guidance does not rely on a ‘counter-
value’ or ‘minimum deterrence’ strategy.” Department of 
Defense, Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy (see note 12), 4. 
16 “Countervalue Targeting. Countervalue targeting 
strategy directs the destruction or neutralization of selected 
Extended Deterrence and US Nuclear Doctrine 
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because – in the view of US military leadership – 
deterrence is ultimately based on the capability of 
destroying those enemy facilities and capabilities that 
“a potential adversary leadership values most and 
that it would rely on to achieve its own objectives in 
a post-war world”.17 Nuclear target planning, as in 
Operation Plan (OPLAN) 8010–12 of July 2012, which 
is apparently still in force, is subject to the strictest 
secrecy. Therefore, it is impossible to say how the 
target planning differs among those countries that 
are considered potential adversaries – and what 
specific consequences the slogan “tailored deter-
rence”, which has found its way into the 2018 NPR, 
entails. The notion of “tailored deterrence” serves 
to signal to potential opponents that they face un-
acceptable costs and risks that are tailored to their 
specific risk and cost calculations.18 As far as official 
documents are concerned, the term “tailored deter-
rence” was first used in the 2006 Quadrennial De-
fense Review Report and highlights the rather trivial 
insight that one should know the adversaries well 
if one wants to influence their perceptions through 
deterrent threats.19 
US nuclear doctrine focusses on the capability of 
having manifold counterforce options. Essentially, its 
proponents put forward three arguments as to why 
 
enemy military and military-related activities, such as 
industries, resources, and/or institutions that contribute to 
the enemy’s ability to wage war. In general, weapons re-
quired to implement this strategy need not be as numerous 
or accurate as those required to implement a counterforce 
targeting strategy, because countervalue targets generally 
tend to be softer and unprotected in relation to counterforce 
targets.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Opera-
tions (see note 14), II–5. (The original contains parts of the 
text in bold font.) 
17 “US nuclear forces deter potential adversaries by provid-
ing the President the means to respond appropriately to an 
attack on the US, its friends or allies. US nuclear forces must 
be capable of, and be seen to be capable of, destroying those 
critical war-making and war-supporting as-sets and capabil-
ities that a potential adversary leadership values most and 
that it would rely on to achieve its own objectives in a post-
war world.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear 
Operations, Joint Publication 3–12, Final Coordination (2) 
(15 March 2005), I–1–2, https://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
wmd/library/policy/dod/jp3_12fc2.pdf (accessed 2 May 2018). 
18 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (see note 
13), VIII. 
19 See, e.g., M. Elaine Bunn, Can Deterrence Be Tailored?, 
Strategic Forum no. 225 (Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, National Defense University, February 2007). 
nuclear deterrence should be based on the ability to 
fight a nuclear war. First, there is the strategic argu-
ment: It is about the credibility of deterrence and the 
need to limit damage in case deterrence fails. The 
second argument is a legal one: Deterrence based on 
counterforce options makes it possible to respect the 
rules of international humanitarian law (in US par-
lance, it is usually referred to as the “law of war” or 
the “law of armed conflict”). Finally, the third argu-
ment claims the moral superiority of such a form of 
deterrence over a minimum countervalue deterrent 
posture.20 These three lines of argument are exam-
ined in more detail below. This evaluation remains 
within the confines of deterrence thinking. In a 
fourth part, a retrospective and forward-looking 
analysis of the risks and costs of the deterrence 
system is presented. 
 
20 For example, Keith B. Payne, “Why US Nuclear Force 
Numbers Matter”, Strategic Studies Quarterly 10, no. 2 (Summer 
2016): 14–24. 
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The credibility problem of nuclear deterrence led to 
the search for viable options to address the problem 
of self-deterrence.21 The issue became virulent when 
the Soviet Union expanded its nuclear arsenal during 
the 1960s and gained “nuclear parity” at the end of 
that decade. The previous strategy of “massive retalia-
tion”, as formulated in the 1950s, in fact aimed at 
the large-scale destruction of industrial and military 
targets and population centres. For example, the first 
Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP), approved by 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower in December 1960, 
contained 3,729 targets in the Soviet Union, China, 
North Korea, and Eastern Europe to be attacked with 
3,423 nuclear weapons. About a fifth of the targets 
were civilian and four-fifths were military targets. 
According to estimates at that time – in which only 
the blast effects were included, since the effects of fire 
and radiation were difficult to measure – approxi-
mately 54 per cent of the Soviet and 16 per cent of 
the Chinese populations, that is, around 220 million 
people, would have fallen victim to these attacks 
within three days.22 Despite changes in the declarato-
ry strategy towards graduated options and “flexible 
 
21 For an early, succinct analysis, see Dieter Senghaas, 
“Rückblick und Ausblick auf Abschreckungspolitik”, in 
Politik und Ethik der Abschreckung. Beiträge zur Herausforderung 
der Nuklearwaffen, ed. Franz Böckle and Gert Krell (Mainz and 
Munich: Grünewald/Kaiser, 1984), 98–132; Gert Krell, “Zur 
Problematik nuklearer Optionen”, in Kernwaffen im Ost-West-
Vergleich. Zur Beurteilung militärischer Potentiale und Fähigkeiten, 
ed. Erhard Forndran and Gert Krell, in collaboration with 
Hans-Joachim Schmidt (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1983), 79–
116. 
22 See Eric Schlosser, Command and Control (London: Pen-
guin Books, 2013), 206. 
response”, nuclear targeting, as reflected in the SIOP, 
remained anything but flexible well into the 1970s.23 
The flexibilisation of nuclear options meant that, 
like conventional weapons, nuclear weapons are 
understood as war-fighting weapons to be used with 
the aim of escalation dominance.24 In classical deter-
rence thinking, escalation dominance means the 
ability to exploit one’s own advantage on a certain 
rung of the “escalation ladder”.25 The prerequisite 
 
23 As William E. Odom, who dealt with nuclear weapons 
in President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Council, wrote: 
“Looking at the SIOP and its executive plan, I realized that 
this was a war plan that did not allow for choosing specific 
war aims at the time and in the context of the outbreak of 
hostilities. It was just a huge mechanical war plan aimed at 
creating maximum damage without regard to the political 
context. I concluded that the United States had surrendered 
political control over nuclear weapons to a deterministic 
theory of war that depoliticized the phenomenon outright 
and ensured an unprecedented devastation of both the 
Soviet Union and the United States.” William E. Odom, “The 
Origins and Design of Presidential Decision-59: A Memoir”, 
in Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origin and 
Practice, ed. Henry D. Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2004), 175–96 
(183). 
24 See Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (see 
note 6), 56–63. On the historical development, see Niccolò 
Petrelli and Giordana Pulcini, “Nuclear Superiority in the 
Age of Parity: US Planning, Intelligence Analysis, Weapons 
Innovation and the Search for a Qualitative Edge 1969–
1976”, The International History Review (22 January 2018); David 
S. McDonough, “The Evolution of American Nuclear Strate-
gy”, Adelphi Papers 46, no. 383 (2006): 13–28. See further 
Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
25 The notion of escalation dominance and the metaphor 
of an “escalation ladder” go back to Herman Kahn, On Esca-
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for escalation dominance is a “favourable asymmetry 
of capabilities”, so that the burden of escalation is 
imposed on the other side.26 In the 1970s, the result-
ing strategy was known as the “countervailing” 
strategy. The term is rarely used in the current debate 
any more, but the underlying logic is very much 
alive: The adversary has to be denied success at all 
levels of warfare. The aim is to deter, but the gap 
between deterrent threats in peace and war-fighting 
in the event of deterrence failure is to be kept as 
narrow as possible. This leads to the “conventionali-
sation” of nuclear warfare – the idea that “a nuclear 
war can be fought in a conventional way, that is, to 
conventionalise nuclear war in order to be able to 
come out of it alive”.27 
The current development of US nuclear policy fol-
lows this logic. This can be clearly seen in the debate 
about strengthening nuclear deterrence against Russia. 
The (military) threat to the eastern NATO states can – 
according to a widespread perception – occur in two 
ways: firstly, in a subversive, hybrid way, in which 
open military force is threatened by Russia, rather 
than actually used; and secondly, through the rapid 
occupation of territory in order to create facts before 
NATO can react. In the latter case, NATO would be 
faced with the choice of engaging in war or accepting 
the territorial loss.28 
It is feared that, during the course of a conven-
tional war, Russia could escalate to the nuclear level 
in order to force an end to the war before the United 
States and other NATO members are able to deploy 
superior conventional forces.29 On the NATO side, 
 
lation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York, NY: Praeger, 1965), 
290. 
26 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy 
(London and New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, third 
edition, 2003), 206. 
27 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Fallacy of Thinking Conven-
tionally about Nuclear Weapons”, in Arms Control and 
Technological Innovation, ed. David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf 
(London: Croom Helm, 1977), 255–64 (256 and 258). 
28 See, e.g., Martin Zapfe, “Deterrence from the Ground 
Up: Understanding NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence”, 
Survival 59, no. 3 (June–July 2017): 147–60. 
29 See Elbridge Colby, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the U.S.-
Russian Relationship, Task Force White Paper (Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, Task Force on U.S. Policy 
toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia Project, 26 February 
2016); on Russian nuclear doctrine, see Olga Oliker, Russia’s 
Nuclear Doctrine: What We Know, What We Don’t, and What That 
Means (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Inter-
under the conditions of the East-West conflict, this 
was an option under the flexible response strategy 
in order to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that any 
conventional attack carried an incalculable risk. 
There is much speculation about Russia’s strategy of 
“escalate to de-escalate”. Official Russian military 
doctrine remains silent about where the threshold 
for using of nuclear weapons actually lies – with the 
exception of the hint that nuclear weapons would 
be used if the existence of the state were threatened. 
A certain ambiguity is also considered useful on the 
Russian side.30 
Should Russia use tactical nuclear weapons with 
relatively low yields, it is feared that NATO would 
have no credible options: Airplanes with gravity 
bombs would hardly overcome Russian air defences. 
Only in a massive military conflict – in which Rus-
sian air defence systems would already be decisively 
weakened – would it make sense to use nuclear 
bombers from bases in Western Europe; everything 
else would probably be nothing more than a “suicide 
mission”.31 
If the use of presently available tactical nuclear 
weapons is seen as being militarily incredible, there 
remain only US strategic nuclear weapons, whose 
early use would be politically incredible. The lack 
of credible options could mean that NATO would be 
forced to end the war rather than risk a massive 
nuclear exchange should Russia resort to using a few 
tactical nuclear weapons.32 Thus, to make clear to 
 
national Studies, May 2016); Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “The 
Myth of Russia’s Lowered Nuclear Threshold”, War on the 
Rocks (22 September 2017), https://warontherocks.com/2017/ 
09/the-myth-of-russias-lowered-nuclear-threshold/ (accessed 
2 May 2018). 
30 See Anya Loukianova Fink, “The Evolving Russian 
Concept of Strategic Deterrence: Risks and Responses”, Arms 
Control Today 47, no. 6 (July/August 2017): 14–20. 
31 Edmond Seay, “NATO’s Incredible Nuclear Strategy: 
Why U.S. Weapons in Europe Deter No One”, Arms Control 
Today 41, no. 9 (November 2011): 8–11; Steve Andreasen, 
“Rethinking NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons”, Survival 59, 
no. 5 (October–November 2017): 47–53. 
32 See Jüri Luik and Tomas Jermalavicius, “A Plausible 
Scenario of Nuclear War in Europe, and How to Deter It: 
A Perspective from Estonia”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, 
no. 4 (2017): 233–39. “Currently, the United States and 
NATO do not have an obvious and credible response to a 
limited Russian nuclear strike. Such a capability is required, 
not so that NATO can fight a nuclear war, but rather to 
demonstrate that NATO has a credible response to any 
feasible scenario in order to deter Russia from conducting 
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Russia that winning a war by escalating will not 
work, the US needs discriminate nuclear options that 
can be credibly threatened and executed. At least this 
is the case if one follows the traditional logic of US 
nuclear strategy.33 
It is therefore not without reason that the old meta-
phor of the “rungs on the escalation ladder” is back in 
vogue. The credibility of deterrence is seen in having 
nuclear options for all conceivable scenarios, options 
that are proportional to the options of the potential 
adversary. In the logic of such thinking, the deficit of 
non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe becomes 
a severe problem, since Russia has a comparatively 
large number of non-strategic nuclear weapons and, 
according to US estimates, is developing low-yield, 
tactical nuclear weapons.34 
The United States needs the capacity 
for a “limited nuclear war”. 
From this point of view, the United States needs 
the capacity for a “limited nuclear war”.35 Should 
 
a nuclear attack in the first place.” Matthew Kroenig, Toward 
a More Flexible NATO Nuclear Posture: Developing a Response to 
Russian Nuclear De-escalation Strike (Washington, DC: Atlantic 
Council, November 2016), 5. 
33 See Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, Coercive Nuclear 
Campaigns in the 21st Century (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgradu-
ate School, The Center on Contemporary Conflict, March 
2013); Clark Murdock, Samuel J. Brannen, Thomas Karako 
and Angela Weaver, Project Atom: A Competitive Strategies 
Approach to Defining U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Posture for 2025–
2050. A Report of the CSIS International Security Program 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), VI; Elbridge Colby, 
A Nuclear Strategy and Posture for 2030 (Washington, DC: 
Center for a New American Security, October 2015). 
34 See Michael Frankel, James Scouras and George Ullrich, 
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons at an Inflection Point (The Johns 
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2017). 
Estimates of the number of non-strategic nuclear warheads 
on the Russian side (including about 760 sea-based war-
heads) total about 2,000. See Hans M. Kristensen and Robert 
S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2017”, Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 73, no. 2 (2017): 115–26. 
35 “Limited nuclear war is a conflict in which nuclear 
weapons are used in small numbers and in a constrained 
manner in pursuit of limited objectives (or are introduced 
by a country or non-state actor in the face of conventional 
defeat).” Jeffrey A. Larsen, “Limited War and the Advent of 
Nuclear Weapons”, in On Limited War in the 21st Century, ed. 
Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner (Stanford, CA: 
there be a military conflict with Russia in Eastern 
Europe or with China in the Pacific in which no vital 
interests of the United States are at stake, then this 
war must be fought in a way that all-out nuclear war 
would be avoided and, at the same time, the political 
purpose can be achieved. This means that in a “com-
petition in brinkmanship”, the United States must 
have the capabilities and the resolve to impose the 
burden of further escalation on the other side.36 This 
view is reflected in the 2018 NPR, which, among 
other things, serves to influence the perceptions of 
potential adversaries. They should come to the 
conclusion that they cannot benefit from a limited 
nuclear escalation.37 The United States therefore 
needs a wider range of graduated nuclear options, in 
particular relatively low-yield nuclear weapons, in 
order to reduce the credibility problem that is in-
herent to the use of strategic nuclear weapons against 
an opponent capable of nuclear counterstrikes. 
Following this logic, low-yield nuclear weapons 
gain importance in a strategy aimed at escalation 
control. The modernised B61 Model 12 gravity bombs, 
which, according to American plans, are to replace 
the old bombs stored in Europe from 2021 onwards, 
have a mechanism to reduce the yield to about two 
per cent of the destructive power of the Hiroshima 
bomb. Some variants of the existing B61 bomb are 
already equipped with such a mechanism. However, 
the modernised B61 bomb is more accurate and 
capable of eliminating hardened targets.38 It is thus 
suitable as a first step in the process of nuclear esca-
lation. From the Russian perspective, it is a cause 
for concern that a new generation of stealth aircraft, 
including the F-35 Lightning 2, could deliver these 
bombs from bases of NATO member states in eastern 
Europe.39 In addition, as announced in the 2018 NPR, 
new low-yield, sea-launched cruise missiles will be 
developed and submarine-based ballistic missiles 
equipped with low-yield nuclear warheads. 
 
Stanford Security Studies, 2014), 3–20 (6, originally in 
italics). 
36 Elbridge Colby, Prevailing in Limited War (Washington, 
DC: Center for a New American Security, August 2016), 26. 
37 For more information, see Department of Defense, 
Nuclear Posture Review (see note 13), VII, 30–32. 
38 See Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “The B61 
Family of Nuclear Bombs”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 70, 
no. 3 (2014): 79–84. 
39 See James E. Doyle, “Strategic Stability and Arms 
Control”, Adelphi Series 56, no. 462 (2016): 49–68 (52–53). 
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The introduction of these weapon systems is 
intended to strengthen the credibility of deterrence 
and raise the nuclear threshold insofar as potential 
adversaries are deterred from engaging in a limited 
nuclear escalation. However, should a military 
conflict arise, one problem remains unsolved in this 
way of thinking: that of controlling nuclear escala-
tion. With regard to the escalation dynamics, two 
problems appear. Firstly, if American nuclear weap-
ons – even if considered tactical – are used against 
targets on Russian soil, then an extremely important 
threshold is crossed. Basically, one can assume that 
there are two central thresholds in the escalatory 
process:40 the use of nuclear weapons at all, and then 
against targets on the territory of the nuclear anta-
gonist. At the time of the East-West conflict, sensi-
tivity to this second threshold was very much present 
in American deterrence thinking. At that time, nu-
clear attacks against Soviet military bases in Eastern 
Europe were an intermediate stage in the escalation 
logic. Today, such an option no longer exists. Second-
ly, Russian early warning systems cannot distinguish 
whether a ballistic missile fired by a US submarine is 
equipped with a warhead of enormous destructive 
power or with a low-yield warhead.41 
Whether – and how – a nuclear war could be 
limited and ended was already a problem under the 
conditions of the East-West confrontation for which 
the protagonists of such a deterrence strategy had no 
convincing answer, except one: namely to have as 
many flexible options as possible.42 This problem is 
reflected in the NPR, which says: 
Every U.S. administration over the past six decades 
has called for flexible and limited U.S. nuclear 
response options, in part to support the goal of 
reestablishing deterrence following its possible 
 
40 The significance of “thresholds” depends on the subjec-
tive perceptions of the participants, thus leaving room for 
much speculation. See Forrest E. Morgan, Karl P. Mueller, 
Evans S. Medeiros, Kevin L. Pollpeter and Roger Cliff, Danger-
ous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 8–11. 
41 See Vipin Narang, “The Discrimination Problem: Why 
Putting Low-yield Nuclear Weapons on Submarines Is So 
Dangerous”, War on the Rocks (2 February 2018), https:// 
warontherocks.com/2018/02/discrimination-problem-putting-
low-yield-nuclear-weapons-submarines-dangerous/ (accessed 
2 May 2018). 
42 See Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (see note 
6), 56–85. 
failure. This is not because reestablishing deter-
rence is certain, but because it may be achievable 
in some cases and contribute to limiting damage, 
to the extent feasible, to the United States, allies, 
and partners.43 
In order to demonstrate the credibility of extended 
nuclear deterrence and to limit the damage in the 
event of deterrence failure, deterrence logic also 
requires the capacity for pre-emptive counterforce 
options. These were part of US deterrence policy 
during the East-West conflict.44 Limiting damage by 
eliminating the adversary’s strategic nuclear potential 
played an important role in the thinking of American 
decision-makers; in public announcements, however, 
mentioning damage limitation through a first strike 
was more or less taboo.45 Pre-emptive options have 
remained part of nuclear deterrence policy; a draft 
document on the doctrine for joint nuclear operations 
openly referred to these options in 2005: 
Deterrence of potential adversary WMD [weapons 
of mass destruction] use requires the potential 
adversary leadership to believe the US has both the 
ability and will to preempt or retaliate promptly 
with responses that are credible and effective.46 
Options to neutralise enemy nuclear weapons span 
wide areas of warfare. They range from more precise, 
low-yield nuclear weapons, whose detonation above 
the “fallout threshold” does not release radioactive 
fallout to the same extent as ground bursts, to cyber 
and anti-submarine warfare, missile defence, and 
precision-guided, long-range conventional weapons 
 
43 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (see note 
13), 23. 
44 See Austin Long, Deterrence from Cold War to Long War: 
Lessons from Six Decades of RAND Research (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2008), 25–43 (quote on p. 27). 
45 Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long, “The 
Geopolitical Origins of US Hard-target-kill Counterforce 
Capabilities and MIRVs”, in Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler 
and Shane Mason, The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First 
to the Second Nuclear Age (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 
May 2016), 19–53 (43). 
46 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, 
2005 (see note 17), I–6. The remarks on preemption led 
to some criticism in Congress; the document was later 
“cancelled”. See “Pentagon Cancels Controversial Nuclear 
Doctrine”, Nuclear Brief, February 2006, http://www.nukestrat. 
com/us/jcs/canceled.htm (accessed 2 May 2018). 
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– all in conjunction with increased information 
processing and remote sensing. These capabilities are 
not – or will not be – limited to the United States, 
but it is leading the way in what has been called the 
“Counterforce Revolution”.47 
 
47 See Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of 
Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict”, Strategic Studies 
Quarterly (Spring 2013), 3–14; Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. 
Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change 
and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence”, International Security 
41, no. 4 (Spring 2017): 9–49. See also Hans M. Kristensen, 
Matthew McKinzie and Theodore A. Postol, “How US Nuclear 
Force Modernization Is Undermining Strategic Stability: The 
Burst-height Compensating Super-fuze”, Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 1 March 2017, https://thebulletin.org/how-us-
nuclear-force-modernization-undermining-strategic-stability-
burst-height-compensating-super10578 (accessed 2 May 
2018). 
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According to the official US view as it has emerged 
over the last two decades, the basic norms of inter-
national humanitarian law (distinction, proportional-
ity, and military necessity) apply to the use of nuclear 
weapons.48 However, this was not always the case. 
Over the course of the Cold War, such considerations 
did not play a significant role. Whether in the context 
of the strategy of “massive retaliation” or later in the 
concept of “assured destruction”, deterrence was 
ultimately based on the threat to destroy the enemy’s 
society, even if it was occasionally declared that 
the Soviet population was not targeted “as such”.49 
“Assured-destruction capability” – according to 
the classic formulation of then-Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara in 1967 – consisted of being able 
to inflict “unacceptable damage” on the enemy even 
after absorbing an enemy first strike, damage to the 
extent that the enemy society “would be simply no 
longer viable in twentieth-century terms. That is what 
deterrence of nuclear aggression means. It means 
the certainty of suicide to the aggressor, not merely to 
his military forces, but to his society as a whole.”50 
 
48 See Department of Defense, Office of General Counsel, 
Department of Defense Law of War Manual (June 2015, updated 
December 2016), 416–18, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did 
=797480 (accessed 2 May 2018). 
49 See Charles H. Builder and Morlie H. Graubard, The 
International Law of Armed Conflict: Implications for the Concept of 
Assured Destruction (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
January 1982). 
50 “Mutual Deterrence”, Speech by Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara (San Francisco, 18 September 1967), 
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Deterrence 
.shtml (accessed 2 May 2018). 
This implied: destruction of at least 30 per cent of the 
population, 50 per cent of industrial capacity, and 
150 cities.51 In such an understanding of deterrence, 
there was no room for international humanitarian 
law. This only changed after the East-West conflict, 
primarily because the US, like other states, had to 
present its position before the International Court 
of Justice in the mid-1990s. The UN General Assembly 
had asked the Court for an advisory opinion on 
whether, under international law, the threat or use 
of nuclear weapons was permitted under all circum-
stances.52 
Nuclear weapons are seen as 
conventional weapons with greater 
explosive power. 
From the American point of view presented to the 
Court, nuclear weapons are not seen as weapons with 
unique characteristics, but rather as conventional 
weapons with greater explosive power.53 It is denied 
 
51 See Schlosser, Command and Control (see note 22), 302. 
52 See Theodore T. Richard, “Nuclear Weapons Targeting: 
The Evolution of Law and U.S. Policy”, Military Law Review 
224, no. 4 (2016): 862–978 (947–49). 
53 On this and the following, see United States Department of 
State, letter dated 20 June 1995 from the acting legal adviser 
to the Department of States, together with written statement 
of the government of the United States of America (before 
the International Court of Justice), https://www.icj-cij.org/ 
files/case-related/95/8700.pdf (accessed 2 May 2018). For a 
critical perspective, see Dean Granoff and Jonathan Granoff, 
“International Humanitarian Law and Nuclear Weapons: 
The Legal Dimension: 
Approaches to Legitimising 
Nuclear Deterrence and Their 
Problems 
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that the use of nuclear weapons has an inherently 
indiscriminate effect. The assumption that any use 
of nuclear weapons will lead to a strategic nuclear 
war in which population centres will be destroyed is 
considered an extreme speculation and cannot be 
the basis for a legal assessment. The precise use of 
low-yield nuclear weapons against military targets 
can satisfy the principle of distinction. It is conceded 
that the use of nuclear weapons has an impact on 
human health and the environment; however, as it 
is argued, this is also the case in conventional wars. 
If the use of nuclear weapons were fundamentally 
contrary to international humanitarian law, and if 
there were no possibility for the legal use of nuclear 
weapons, the system of nuclear deterrence could 
hardly be legally defended. That the legality of nu-
clear deterrence depends on the legality of the use of 
nuclear weapons was not questioned in the US state-
ment before the Court. The United States – in its self-
image a law-abiding nation – must claim legal 
justification for the possible use of nuclear weapons; 
otherwise this would undermine the credibility of 
the deterrent threat.54 
Another justification under customary inter-
national law rests upon the use of nuclear weapons 
as a reprisal against the use of nuclear weapons by 
another state. Reprisals must be implemented with 
the intention of putting an end to violations of the 
law of armed conflict by the other party after all 
other means have been exhausted. Furthermore, re-
prisals must be proportional to the unlawful conduct 
of the other party. According to the American view, 
it depends on the individual case as to how reprisals 
are to be assessed legally. The First Additional Protocol 
to the Geneva Conventions (1977) prohibits attacks 
against civilians as reprisal, but the United States, like 
many other states, recognises the provisions of the 
Additional Protocol only with regard to the use of 
conventional weapons (the United States has not rati-
fied the Protocol; France, the United Kingdom, and 
 
Irreconcilable Differences”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67, 
no. 6 (2011): 53–62. 
54 “Law-abiding States committed to nuclear deterrence as 
a means to international stability must maintain the posi-
tion that nuclear weapon use is ultimately permitted by the 
law of war, or their deterrence policies will forsake credibil-
ity.” Lt. Col. Ted Richard and Sean Watts, “The International 
Legal Environment for Nuclear Deterrence”, justsecurity.org 
(27 March 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/39281/inter 
national-legal-environment-nuclear-deterrence/ (accessed 
2 May 2018). 
some other NATO member states have done so only 
with the aforementioned reservation).55 
Nuclear planners in the United States have declared 
their efforts to use nuclear weapons in a manner that 
complies with international war law, in particular the 
principle of distinction and proportionality.56 How-
ever, legitimate military objects are understood in a 
very broad sense and “loopholes” are created, so that 
even military operations with millions of “collateral” 
victims among the civilian population can be inter-
preted as being consistent with international humani-
tarian law.57 According to the Department of Defense 
Law of War Manual, “war-sustaining” and not only 
“war-supporting” objects are considered legitimate 
targets, including such objects that could be used 
later for military purposes: 
Military action has a broad meaning and is under-
stood to mean the general prosecution of the war. 
It is not necessary that the object provide immedi-
ate tactical or operational gains or that the object 
make an effective contribution to a specific mili-
tary operation. Rather, the object’s effective contri-
bution to the war-fighting or war-sustaining capa-
bility of an opposing force is sufficient. Although 
terms such as “war-fighting”, “war-supporting”, 
and “war-sustaining” are not explicitly reflected in 
the treaty definitions of military objective, the 
United States has interpreted the military objective 
definition to include these concepts.58 
 
55 On this and the legal aspects, see Charles J. Moxley, Jr., 
John Burroughs and Jonathan Granoff, “Nuclear Weapons 
and Compliance with International Humanitarian Law and 
the Non-proliferation Treaty”, Fordham International Law 
Journal 34, no. 4 (2011): 594–696. 
56 As the Employment Guidance 2013 states: “The new 
guidance makes clear that all plans must also be consistent 
with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed 
Conflict. Accordingly, plans will, for example, apply the 
principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to 
minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and 
civilian objects. The United States will not intentionally 
target civilian populations or civilian objects.” Department 
of Defense, Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy (see note 12), 
4–5. 
57 On this and the following, see Jeffrey G. Lewis and Scott 
D. Sagan, “The Nuclear Necessity Principle: Making U.S. 
Targeting Policy Conform with Ethics & the Laws of War”, 
Daedalus 145, no. 4 (Autumn 2016): 62–74.  
58 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Law of War 
Manual (see note 48), 214. 
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This is a much broader and controversial interpreta-
tion of an effective contribution to military action 
than the wording of the First Additional Protocol to 
the Geneva Convention suggests (Article 52): If the 
nature of the object, its location, and its purpose 
make an effective contribution to military actions, 
and a definite military advantage can be expected 
from its destruction or neutralisation under the given 
circumstances, then this is a military object. 
Even if protected objects must not be attacked 
intentionally, there are exceptions to this rule, 
according to the joint targeting manual of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff of 2013: 
Civilian populations and civilian/protected objects 
may not be intentionally targeted, although there 
are exceptions to this rule. Civilian objects consist 
of all civilian property and activities other than 
those used to support or sustain warfighting 
capability. Acts of violence solely intended to 
spread fear among the civilian population are 
prohibited.59 
In summary, the legal defence for the use of nucle-
ar weapons has two elements that, together, expand 
the universe of legitimate goals to such an extent that 
counterforce attacks with a high number of civilian 
victims become legally unproblematic. As long as 
very broadly defined military objects are attacked and 
the death of civilians is not intended – but a side 
effect, albeit a foreseeable one – everything seems 
possible. This, by the way, was the line of argument 
used to legally justify massive area bombardments 
and the destruction of entire cities during the Second 
World War and, in particular, during the Korean 
War.60 
 
59 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Targeting, Joint Publication 3–
60 (31 January 2013), A–2, https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/Joint_Chiefs-Joint_Targeting_2013 
0131.pdf (accessed 2 May 2018). 
60 On this, see Sahr Conway-Lanz, “Bombing Civilians after 
World War II: The Persistence of Norms against Targeting 
Civilians in the Korean War”, in The American Way of Bombing: 
Changing Ethical and Legal Norms, from Flying Fortresses to Drones, 
ed. Matthew Evangelista and Henry Shue (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2014), 47–63. 
Legitimising the use of nuclear 
weapons focusses on targeted strikes 
of low-yield nuclear weapons. 
The attempt to construct the possibility for a 
legally permissible use of nuclear weapons focusses 
on singular strikes with low-yield nuclear weapons 
directed against military targets. However, it is ques-
tionable whether even such a limited use is consistent 
with international humanitarian law, since the con-
sequences from radioactive fallout and radiation can-
not be contained. In addition, this way of defending 
the use of nuclear weapons completely ignores 
the cumulative effects of many “smaller” nuclear 
strikes.61 
Certainly, damage estimates for nuclear war sce-
narios should be viewed with scepticism. But they 
give an idea of what a massive use of nuclear weap-
ons could mean for the civilian population – even 
if it were only directed against Russian nuclear 
weapons and their infrastructure (including C3 facil-
ities). A calculation based on the use of 1,300 Ameri-
can warheads concludes that eight to twelve million 
people would die among the Russian population, 
and several millions more would be injured. Even the 
most precise attacks against military targets would 
inevitably lead to high numbers of casualties among 
civilians, not least because of the radioactive fallout.62 
In addition, there are the climatic consequences 
resulting from nuclear war. In the 1980s, the discus-
sion was conducted under the heading “nuclear 
winter”; it broke off when the East-West conflict 
came to an end. With the reduction in the number 
of warheads – and, on average, also their yields – 
the scenario of a thermonuclear war, in which the 
United States and the Soviet Union would use nuclear 
arsenals the size of 5,000 megatons, lost plausibility 
and political relevance. The debate has only got under 
way again over the last 10 years and is now based on 
 
61 Even if the attacks directed against military targets are 
far from population centres, it was argued that the following 
principle should be applied: “… a presumption of illegality 
with regard to the use of such weapons outside populated 
areas”. Louis Maresca and Eleanor Mitchell, “The Human 
Costs and Legal Consequences of Nuclear Weapons under 
International Humanitarian Law”, International Review of the 
Red Cross 97, no. 899 (2015): 621–45 (645). 
62 Matthew G. McKinzie, Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. 
Norris and William M. Arkin, The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time 
for Change (New York, NY: Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, June 2001). 
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climate models developed to assess global warming. 
It must be assumed that even a “limited” regional 
nuclear war, for example between India and Pakistan, 
in which 50 warheads the size of the Hiroshima bomb 
would be used, could have catastrophic consequences 
for the climate, and thus also for food production. 
This might expose two billion people to the risk of 
starvation. To a large extent, the environmental 
effects of nuclear weapons depend on the degree to 
which the detonations lead to fires – and hence 
pollute the atmosphere, and ultimately the strato-
sphere, with smoke and soot absorbing the solar 
radiation. This would lead to a warming of the strato-
sphere and possibly to massive damage to the ozone 
layer as a result of increased UV radiation. But the 
most devastating effects would result from the cool-
ing of the Earth’s surface, namely reduced plant 
growth and crop yields.63 
Although this discussion has been reflected since 
2007 in scientific journals and at international 
conferences on the humanitarian consequences of 
nuclear weapons use, it has been largely ignored by 
US politicians, the Department of Defense, and the 
Department of Energy. The “nuclear winter” theory is 
apparently deemed to be obsolete, if today’s nuclear 
planners even know about it at all.64 Atmospheric 
consequences of nuclear weapon detonations are not 
taken into account in their calculations. Not only in 
this respect is there considerable uncertainty about 
the harmful physical consequences of the explosions 
of nuclear weapons, as even scientists who are not 
opposed to nuclear deterrence admit.65 
 
63 See Seth D. Baum, “Winter-safe Deterrence: The Risk of 
Nuclear Winter and Its Challenge to Deterrence”, Contempo-
rary Security Policy 36, no. 1 (2015): 123–48; furthermore, 
Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon, “Self-assured Destruc-
tion: The Climate Impacts of Nuclear War”, Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 68, no. 2 (2012): 66–74; Ira Helfand, Nuclear 
Famine: Two Billion People at Risk? Global Impacts of Limited 
Nuclear War on Agriculture, Food Supplies, and Human Nutrition 
(International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear 
War/Physicians for Social Responsibility, November 2013). 
64 See Steven Starr, “Turning a Blind Eye towards Arma-
geddon – U.S. Leaders Reject Nuclear Winter Studies” 
(9 January 2017); https://fas.org/2017/01/turning-a-blind-eye-
towards-armageddon-u-s-leaders-reject-nuclear-winter-
studies/ (accessed 2 May 2018); Alan Robock, “Nuclear 
Winter Is a Real and Present Danger”, Nature 473 (19 May 
2011): 275–76. 
65 See Michael Frankel, James Scouras and George Ullrich, 
The Uncertain Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Use (The Johns 
 
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2015), 8–9, 
37. 
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Nuclear deterrence is not only confronted with prob-
lems under international humanitarian law, but also 
with the fundamental problem of how to justify it 
morally. Intended as an instrument to prevent the use 
of force, deterrence is based on the contingent inten-
tion of using force to an extent that cannot be justi-
fied (or only under narrow hypothetical conditions) 
according to the jus in bello criteria, which play a cen-
tral role not only in international humanitarian law, 
but also in ethical discussions. The objection is that 
the deterrent threat is ultimately based on inflicting 
serious harm on innocent people without their con-
sent, taking them as hostages, and therefore degrad-
ing them to a mere means.66 
Counterforce strategies are 
propagated as a way out of the moral 
dilemma posed by nuclear 
deterrence. 
If nuclear weapons are (can be) used in such a way 
that non-combatants are not attacked intentionally 
and the population is not taken hostage, then – it 
seems – the fundamental objection against nuclear 
deterrence loses its validity. However, it can be ar-
gued that the use of nuclear weapons solely against 
military targets cannot be effective in terms of deter-
rence. If one renounces the option of escalating up to 
the destruction of enemy cities, one deprives oneself 
of the possibility to prevent the enemy from escalat-
 
66 In detail on these questions, see Steven P. Lee, Morality, 
Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1993), 35–81. 
ing to this level during a war (in the sense of intra-
war deterrence), and thus to limit the war. This is 
precisely one of the expectations attached to a deter-
rent based upon a countervailing approach, as then-
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown made clear in 
1979: “[I]t is essential at all times to retain the option 
to attack urban-industrial targets – both as a deter-
rent to attacks on our own cities and as the final 
retaliation if that particular deterrent should fail.”67 
Anyone who wants to invalidate these fundamen-
tal moral objections to nuclear deterrence would have 
to plausibly prove, on the one hand, that the prin-
ciples of distinction and proportionality will not be 
violated within the framework of a counterforce 
strategy, and that a nuclear war can be limited. On 
the other hand, convincing arguments must be made 
that the threat to eventually use nuclear force on 
a massive – and hence immoral – scale would not 
be immoral in itself.68 
Occasionally, it has been argued in ethical debates 
that the use of nuclear weapons is not intentionally 
aimed at killing non-combatants. But one can object 
that the strategic purpose of deterrence is to threaten 
unacceptable damage, which always implicitly in-
 
67 Quote in: Daniel J. Arbess and Simeon A. Sahaydachny, 
“Nuclear Deterrence and International Law: Some Steps 
toward Observance”, Alternatives 12 (1987): 83–111 (90); on 
the problem, see Lee, Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons 
(see note 66), 166–75. 
68 Rejecting these arguments, see C. A. J. Coady, “Escaping 
from the Bomb: Immoral Deterrence and the Problem of 
Extrication”, in Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint: Critical 
Choices for American Strategy, ed. Henry Shue (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 163–225. 
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cludes losses among the civilian population. From 
this perspective, intentionality is causally determined 
by strategic purpose – not by the fact of whether the 
missiles are directly aimed at civilians, but whether 
harm to non-combatants is accepted as expedient.69 
Apologists of nuclear deterrence offer contradic-
tory arguments when they engage in ethical debates: 
While denying the unique character of nuclear weap-
ons and claiming that it is possible to use them in a 
morally and legally legitimate way, they also postu-
late the superiority of nuclear deterrence over con-
ventional deterrence – because the former is ulti-
mately based on the risk of uncontrollable escalation 
and, consequently, unacceptably high costs.70 
However, as some advocates of nuclear deterrence 
based on credible warfighting options have pointed 
out, the position that emerged in the churches during 
public nuclear ethics debates in the early 1980s 
suffers from its own incoherence.71 Under the condi-
tions of the East-West conflict, the Catholic Church 
and some mainline Protestant churches adopted the 
position that nuclear deterrence was acceptable for a 
limited time as an instrument of war prevention, but 
that it had to be overcome in the long term because 
of its risks and costs.72 Interim ethical positions have 
assumed that it is possible to separate the deterrent 
threat from the actual use of nuclear weapons. Nu-
clear threats with the sole aim of preventing war were 
considered (conditionally) acceptable; however, the 
actual use of nuclear weapons was (almost always) 
 
69 See John Finnis, Joseph Boyle and Germain Grisez, 
Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1987), 92–94. 
70 On this contradiction, see Lothar Waas, “Ethische 
Theorien und nukleare Abschreckungsstrategie: Möglich-
keiten und Grenzen der moralischen Beurteilung”, in: 
Nukleare Abschreckung – Politische und ethische Interpretationen 
einer neuen Realität, ed. Uwe Nerlich and Trutz Rendtorff, in 
collaboration with Lothar Waas, Internationale Politik und 
Sicherheit, vol. 25 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
1989), 655–88 (666). 
71 See Michael Quinlan, “The Ethics of Nuclear Deterrence: 
A Critical Comment on the Pastoral Letter of the U.S. Catho-
lic Bishops”, Theological Studies 48 (1987): 3–24. 
72 As an overview, see Stephen R. Rock, “From Just War to 
Nuclear Pacifism: The Evolution of U.S. Christian Thinking 
about War in the Nuclear Age, 1946–1989”, Social Sciences 7, 
no. 6 (2018), https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci7060082; in 
addition, see Emmanuelle Maître, Is Nuclear Deterrence Morally 
Defensible? Religious Perspectives (Paris: Fondation pour la 
Recherche Stratégique, November 2016). 
prohibited because it would not comply with the 
principles of distinction and proportionality. 
Nuclear interim ethic has passed its 
“expiration date”. 
The conditioned toleration of nuclear deterrence 
was clearly expressed in the Pastoral Letter of the 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops – 
written in 1983 against the background of fierce con-
troversies over nuclear arms. The conditions for the 
interim acceptance of nuclear deterrence included, in 
particular, the renunciation of nuclear supremacy, 
the orientation towards war prevention and stability, 
and compatibility with disarmament. With the end 
of the East-West conflict, the political conditions 
under which nuclear deterrence was regarded as ac-
ceptable ceased to exist, namely a perceived threat 
from a totalitarian Soviet regime. As a reaction to the 
inertia of the nuclear deterrence system, at least in 
the Vatican’s statements there is a clear shift away 
from interim ethics.73 Some statements suggest the 
interpretation that the Holy See has adopted a nu-
clear-pacifist position – especially as illustrated by 
Pope Francis’s statement in November 2017 that 
the threat of using nuclear weapons, as well as their 
very possession, is to be firmly condemned.74 Nuclear 
interim ethic, as formulated at the beginning of the 
1980s, has passed its “expiration date”.75 
Of course, one can completely break away from the 
bellum-justum tradition and evaluate nuclear deter-
 
73 See Paolo Foradori, “The Moral Dimension of ‘Global 
Zero’: The Evolution of the Catholic Church’s Nuclear Ethics 
in a Changing World”, Nonproliferation Review 21, no. 2 (2014): 
189–205; in addition, see Gregory M. Reichberg, “The Moral-
ity of Nuclear Deterrence: A Reassessment”, in Nuclear Deter-
rence: An Ethical Perspective, ed. Matthias Nebel and Gregory M. 
Reichberg (Chambésy: The Caritas in Veritate Foundation, 
2015), 9–31. 
74 Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to participants in 
the international symposium “Prospects for a World Free of 
Nuclear Weapons and for Integral Disarmament” (10 Novem-
ber 2017), https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches 
/2017/november/documents/papa-francesco_20171110 
_convegno-disarmointegrale.html (accessed 13 August 2018). 
75 Laurie Johnston, “Nuclear Deterrence: When an Interim 
Ethic Reaches Its Expiration Date”, Political Theology Today, 
9 May 2014, https://politicaltheology.com/nuclear-deterrence-
when-an-interim-ethic-reaches-its-expiration-date/ (accessed 
2 May 2018). In addition, see Gerard Powers, “Papal Con-
demnation of Nuclear Deterrence and What Is Next”, Arms 
Control Today 48, no. 4 (May 2018): 6–11. 
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rence purely in terms of consequentialist ethics. From 
this perspective, it is pivotal as to whether nuclear 
deterrence prevents more harm than a renunciation 
of deterrence.76 However, such impact assessments 
are subject to great uncertainty. As the ethical debates 
on nuclear deterrence at the time of the East-West 
confrontation showed, any probability estimates of 
this kind are based on highly speculative empirical 
assumptions.77 
Since traditional ethical approaches to the evalua-
tion of nuclear deterrence lead to aporias,78 the idea 
of interpreting nuclear deterrence as a genuine ethi-
cal theory of war prevention aimed at “eliminating 
war as a political option” was brought into play a few 
decades ago – still under the conditions of the fading 
East-West conflict.79 This justification presupposes 
that nuclear deterrence resulting from the anticipated 
possibility of mutual destruction can permanently 
prevent war and eliminate military options as a means 
of policy between nuclear powers. But the real devel-
opment of deterrence policy, at least on the US side, 
tends to undermine the basis of the postulated peace-
preserving effect. Nuclear deterrence policy inevitably 
has to reckon with its failure and, accordingly, look 
for offensive, damage-limiting options, either because 
in the long run the adversary may not be the ration-
ally calculating actor presupposed in the deterrence 
scenario, or because in a crisis he seeks, quite ration-
ally, to exploit the mutual interest of avoiding atomic 
destruction to his own advantage. Attempts to recon-
struct nuclear deterrence as an ethical theory of war 
prevention fail because of the actual development of 
nuclear deterrence policy. 
 
76 See, e.g., Dieter Birnbacher, “Das moralische Dilemma 
der nuklearen Abschreckung”, in Analyse & Kritik 9 (1987): 
175–92. On consequentialist arguments for and against 
nuclear deterrence, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Konsequentialis-
tische Ethik und nukleare Abschreckung”, in Nukleare 
Abschreckung, ed. Nerlich and Rendtorff (see note 70), 635–
54. 
77 Waas, “Ethische Theorien und nukleare Abschreckungs-
strategien”, in Nukleare Abschreckung, ed. Nerlich and Rend-
torff (see note 70), 669. 
78 See Trutz Rendtorff, “Überlegungen zur ethischen 
Interpretation der nuklearen Abschreckung”, in Nukleare 
Abschreckung, ed. Nerlich and Rendtorff (see note 70), 715–
30. 
79 Uwe Nerlich and Trutz Rendtorff, “Die Zukunft der 
nuklearen Abschreckung. Einige Folgerungen für Theorie 
und Praxis”, in Nukleare Abschreckung, ed. Nerlich and Rend-
torff (see note 70), 851–64 (863). 
 The Political Dimension: Risks and Costs of the Deterrence System 
 SWP Berlin 
 US Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Its Problems 
 November 2018 
 23 
The often-heard notion of “nuclear peace” is nothing 
more than a speculative hypothesis, proponents of 
which claim that nuclear deterrence secured peace 
between the East and West for decades, and therefore 
nuclear deterrence will continue to guarantee the 
absence of war between nuclear-armed states or alli-
ances. But the absence of a war between the then-
superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union 
– can also be explained by the fact that the terri-
torial division of the European continent had created 
such a degree of mutual security that a change in 
the balance of power would not have brought any 
corresponding benefits compared to the costs of a 
new, large-scale conventional war.80 However, this 
explanation is also nothing more than a counter-
factual speculation. 
What can be said with certainty, however, is that 
an armed conflict between nuclear powers is by no 
means excluded. This was demonstrated, on the one 
hand, by the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969 and, 
on the other hand, by the Kargil War between India 
and Pakistan in 1999.81 In the latter case, we can 
speak of war according to the criterion used in war 
studies, namely of more than 1,000 battle-related 
deaths over the course of one year. Pakistan began 
this war over the Kashmir region, obviously in the 
expectation that, under conditions of mutual nuclear 
deterrence, it could quickly decide a limited con-
 
80 See John D. Orme, “The War That Never Happened: 
Structure, Statesmanship, and the Origins of the Long 
Peace”, Security Studies 10, no. 4 (Summer 2001): 117–42. 
81 For the Soviet-Chinese border conflict no reliable loss 
figures are available. For more information on this conflict, 
see Michael S. Gerson, The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict: Deterrence, 
Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969 (Alexandria, 
VA: Center for Naval Analyses, November 2010). 
ventional war in its own favour, whereas India would 
shy away from a larger conventional war with its in-
herent risk of nuclear escalation. In academic research, 
this war is interpreted in light of the so-called stabil-
ity–instability paradox. Stability at the nuclear strat-
egic level can lead one side to use limited force in the 
expectation that the other side will react cautiously 
in order to avoid nuclear war.82 
Looking back, one may speak of luck that there 
was no use of nuclear weapons between the United 
States/NATO and the Soviet Union due to miscalcula-
tions and errors.83 According to another interpreta-
tion, it was not luck, but rather the interaction of 
human prudence and functioning control systems 
that prevented the use of nuclear weapons. Even in 
the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the use of 
nuclear weapons might have been most likely, it is 
argued that the launch of a Soviet nuclear torpedo 
would not necessarily have meant an escalation to 
a thermonuclear war.84 Whether luck or prudence, 
the system of deterrence was by no means as stable 
as the talk of a “balance of terror” through “mutual 
 
82 See Benoit Pelopidas, “A Bet Portrayed As a Certainty: 
Reassessing the Added Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weap-
ons”, in The War That Must Never Be Fought: Dilemmas of Nuclear 
Deterrence, ed. George P. Shultz and James E. Goodby (Stan-
ford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2015), 5–55 (11–13); 
Christopher J. Watterson, “Competing Interpretations of the 
Stability-instability-paradox: The Case of the Kargil War”, 
The Nonproliferation Review 24, no. 1–2 (2017): 83–99. 
83 See Patricia Lewis, Heather Williams, Benoit Pelopidas 
and Sasan Aghlani, Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear 
Use and Options for Policy (London: The Royal Institute for 
International Affairs, 2014). 
84 Bruno Tertrais, “‘On the Brink’ – Really? Revisiting 
Nuclear Close Calls since 1945”, The Washington Quarterly 40, 
no. 2 (2017): 51–66. 
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assured destruction” suggests. Both sides feared that, 
in an escalating crisis, the other side might resort to 
a pre-emptive first strike.85 
Even after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the nuclear 
deterrent relationship between the United States and 
the Soviet Union was by no means as stable as the 
thesis of the “long peace” conveys. As became appar-
ent in the autumn of 1983, a misjudgment of the 
opponent’s capabilities and intentions and a lack of 
sensitivity to the other side’s threat perception can 
lead to a potentially dangerous situation. The Ameri-
can countervailing strategy of the late 1970s – with 
its focus on decapitation attacks against the Soviet 
leadership and command facilities, loose talk about 
winning a nuclear war, and the planned and sub-
sequent deployment of intermediate-range nuclear 
weapons in Europe – fuelled fear on the Soviet 
side that the United States might have a nuclear first-
strike in mind. The Soviet leadership was concerned 
about the vulnerability of its nuclear forces.86 Soviet 
early warning systems were in a precarious state, and 
the nuclear command-and-control systems were con-
sidered unreliable. In the view of Soviet intelligence 
services, which, like their US counterparts, tended to 
overestimate enemy capabilities, the United States 
had acquired the ability to destroy Soviet command 
centres by using nuclear weapons and new precision-
guided conventional weapons. Fear of an American 
pre-emptive attack was prompted in November 1983, 
shortly before the deployment of medium-range 
nuclear missiles, when NATO conducted the nuclear 
exercise “Able Archer”. But in the end, the Soviet 
leadership correctly assessed Western intentions and 
– apart from a few precautions, such as raising the 
alert level of its own forces – refrained from taking 
more far-reaching steps that could have led to a 
crisis.87 There is some controversy about whether the 
Soviets really feared an American attack and how 
great the danger of nuclear escalation actually was at 
 
85 See Bruce Blair, “Mad Fiction”, The Nonproliferation Review 
21, no. 2 (2014): 239–50. 
86 See Brendan R. Green and Austin Long, “The MAD Who 
Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear 
Balance”, Security Studies 26, no. 4 (2017): 606–41. 
87 See Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, “The 1983 Nuclear Crisis 
– Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice”, Journal of 
Strategic Studies 36, no. 1 (2013): 4–41. In detail and with 
reprints of numerous originally secret documents, see Nate 
Jones, Able Archer 83: The Secret History of the NATO Exercise 
That Almost Triggered Nuclear War (New York, NY, and London: 
The New Press, 2016). 
the time.88 A long-classified retrospective assessment 
of the US president’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board, written in 1990 and made public in 2015, con-
cluded that the US intelligence services had mis-
judged the Soviet threat perception and had not taken 
the Soviet fear of an American pre-emptive strike 
seriously enough89 – and had therefore provided the 
president with analyses that underestimated the risks 
for the United States: “In 1983 we may have inadver-
tently placed our relations with the Soviet Union on 
a hair trigger.”90 
The stability of the deterrence system 
cannot be taken for granted. 
Due to technological developments, the problem 
of strategic stability may become more precarious 
today than at the time of the East-West conflict. In 
particular, progress in cyber warfare, but also devel-
opments in far-reaching conventional weapons, anti-
satellite weapons, (American) missile defence, and 
autonomous weapon systems create the risk that, in 
an escalating crisis, second-strike capabilities might 
be seen as endangered, because the command, con-
trol, and communication systems could be vulner-
able. Such fears are, it seems, more pronounced on 
the Russian than on the American side, but they are 
already being raised among US experts.91 The stability 
of the deterrence system cannot be taken for granted. 
 
88 See Klaas Voß, “Die Enden der Parabel. Die Nuklear-
waffenübung ‘Able Archer’ im Krisenjahr 1983”, Mittelweg 
36, no. 6 (December 2014/January 2015): 73–92. 
89 “We believe that the Soviets perceived that the correla-
tion of forces had turned against the USSR, that the US was 
seeking military superiority, and that the chances of the US 
launching a nuclear first strike – perhaps under cover of 
a routine training exercise – were growing.” President’s 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, The Soviet “War Scare” 
(15 February 1990), VII. The document, which was declassi-
fied in 2015, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//nukevault/ebb533-
The-Able-Archer-War-Scare-Declassified-PFIAB-Report-
Released/2012-0238-MR.pdf (accessed 2 May 2018); see also 
Benjamin B. Fischer, “Scolding Intelligence: The PFIAB 
Report on the Soviet War Scare”, International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 31, no. 1 (2018): 102–15. 
90 President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, The 
Soviet “War Scare” (see note 89), XII. 
91 See James N. Miller and Richard Fontaine, A New Era in 
U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability: How Changing Geopolitics and 
Emerging Technologies Are reshaping Pathways to Crisis and Conflict 
(Cambridge, MA, and Washington, DC: Harvard Kennedy 
School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs/ 
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As in the past, one has to expect that mutual 
nuclear deterrence feeds and cements an adversarial 
political relationship. In the system of deterrence, 
as developed under the conditions of the East-West 
conflict, the opponent was “condemned to be the 
eternal potential aggressor”.92 Whether he had the 
aggressive intentions attributed to him was irrelevant. 
His capabilities alone made him threatening. Threat 
assessments were conducted solely on the basis of 
enemy capabilities and apolitical worst-case scenarios, 
which presumed Soviet aggressiveness. Looking back 
at the years 1947–1953, when threat perceptions 
became entrenched, it is in no way obvious, or even 
plausible, that the Soviet Union was willing or able to 
conquer Western Europe.93 As far as the available 
sources indicate, the argument that without nuclear 
deterrence the Soviet leadership would have attacked 
Western Europe lacks empirical evidence.94 
In retrospect, one cannot demonstrate the exist-
ence of aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union and 
the Warsaw Pact against Western Europe. But the 
Soviet leadership’s military planning was geared to-
wards offensive warfare in the event of a war, which, 
in the Soviet threat perception, would have been 
initiated by the capitalist West. Never again should 
the Soviet Union become the victim of invasion and 
the scene of war; the war would be waged on the 
territory of the enemy and end victoriously with rapid 
offensive operations and the dismantling of NATO 
military forces. The United States and NATO, on the 
other hand, only aimed at restoring the territorial 
status quo ante in their military planning; at least 
this had been the case since the mid-1950s. The early 
 
Center for a New American Security, September 2017); James 
N. Miller, Richard Fontaine and Alexander Velez-Green, 
“Averting the U.S.-Russia War Path”, The National Interest 
(March–April 2018); Greg Austin and Pavel Sharikov, “‘Pre-
emption Is Victory’: Aggravated Nuclear Instability of the 
Information Age”, The Nonproliferation Review 23, no. 5–6 
(2016): 691–704; Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, “Thermo-
nuclear Cyberwar”, Journal of Cybersecurity 3, no. 1 (2017): 
37–48; Charles K. Bartles, “Russian Threat Perception and 
the Ballistic Missile Defense System”, Journal of Slavic Military 
Studies 30, no. 2 (2017): 152–69. 
92 Dieter Senghaas, Abschreckung und Frieden. Studien zur 
Kritik organisierter Friedlosigkeit (Frankfurt am Main: Europäi-
sche Verlagsanstalt, 1981), 87. 
93 See Michael MccGwire, “Appendix 2: Nuclear Deter-
rence”, International Affairs 82, no. 4 (2006): 771–84 (771). 
94 See Richard Ned Lebow, “Deterrence: Then and Now”, 
Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 5 (2005): 765–73. 
military plans of NATO and the United States were 
aimed at defeating the Soviet Union and establishing 
a different regime, but the West moved away from 
this goal as the Soviet Union built up its nuclear 
arms.95 According to an American analysis commis-
sioned by the Pentagon in 1995 and based on inter-
views with former Soviet military officers and ana-
lysts, Soviet intentions were often misjudged – with 
the result that their aggressiveness was overestimated, 
and the extent to which the Soviet leadership was 
deterred from using nuclear weapons was underesti-
mated.96 
In crises, the existence of mutual vulnerability 
during the East-West conflict had a moderating effect 
on the behaviour of American and Soviet leaders. 
Although the political leaders of both countries ap-
proved nuclear warfighting strategies, sometimes 
used reckless nuclear rhetoric, and did not shy away 
from engaging in crises, the burden of responsibility 
weighed heavily when push came to shove.97 But 
on the whole, nuclear deterrence cemented the East-
West antagonism by aggravating the security di-
lemma and fuelling the arms competition. This latter 
conflict dimension remained acute, even after the 
geopolitical core conflict in Central Europe had been 
defused by the establishment of clear spheres of 
influence; this finally became the case when, in the 
early 1960s, the Berlin question lost its crisis poten-
tial.98 Even when the Soviet Union under Gorbachev 
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further Jan Hoffenaar and Christopher Findlay, eds., Military 
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took reconciliatory steps, these had only a limited 
impact.99 It took until the end of the geopolitical and 
systemic conflict for the Soviet Union to no longer 
be perceived as a threat. But the nuclear deterrence 
system lived on. In the United States, nuclear deter-
rence had gained an ideological character – in the 
sense of a system of assumptions that have dogmatic 
status within the group that firmly believes in nu-
clear deterrence as the ultimate guarantee of peace 
between great powers.100 
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US nuclear doctrine is based on flexible, graduated 
counterforce options. This “conventionalisation” can 
be understood as an attempt to make the threat and 
use of nuclear weapons strategically rational, and 
legally as well as morally acceptable. However, as the 
analysis has shown, this nuclear doctrine does not 
provide a way out of the dilemmas of nuclear deter-
rence. In the political debate, these dilemmas tend 
to be ignored, based on the confidence that nuclear 
deterrence will keep the peace. But this confidence 
in the stability of the deterrence system, as expressed 
in the talk of “nuclear peace”, is based on downright 
dogmatic assumptions. Nuclear deterrence policy 
must prepare for its failure. The resulting search for 
offensive, damage-limiting options undermines the 
condition that, according to the logic of mutual vul-
nerability, is the pillar of strategic stability. 
Nuclear deterrence is a construct in which as-
sumptions play a fundamental role – hypotheses 
that lack an empirical basis.101 Thus, a central ques-
tion, namely that of credibility, has been answered 
differently for decades: Some believe that deterrent 
threats against a nuclear-armed opponent such as 
Russia can only be credible if the United States has 
the widest possible range of graduated options and 
escalation dominance. Others believe that, in a situa-
tion of mutual vulnerability, it is sufficiently dis-
suasive that a military confrontation entails incalcu-
lable escalatory risks that are hard to control.102 
From the first viewpoint, which has shaped US 
nuclear doctrine, a variety of options are needed. 
In this sense, nuclear weapons are weapons of war-
fighting – and not, as occasionally heard in Euro-
pean debates, “political weapons of deterrence”. 
Those who tend towards the second perspective 
conceive of deterrence foremost as a “competition 
in risk-taking”. It is particularly important to use 
 
101 See Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: 
Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY, and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1989), 182–83. 
102 On this and the following, see Jervis, The Illogic of 
American Nuclear Strategy (see note 6), passim.  
conventional forces to prevent a potential adversary 
from rapidly changing the military status quo and to 
confront him with the risk of entering a process with 
a potentially catastrophic outcome. In this sense, 
the credibility of extended deterrence rests not on the 
diversity of nuclear options, but on the political 
determination to take risks for the defence of allies. 
As these competing perspectives show, nuclear 
deterrence remains a highly speculative endeavour. 
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